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INTRODUCTION 
Professor Gerken’s outstanding essay, Federalism and Nationalism: Time 
for a Détente?, aims to reframe the debate between “federalism’s stalwarts” 
and what might be called traditional nationalists. On Gerken’s account, the 
stalwarts champion a “state-centered democracy . . . that emphasizes state 
power, state politics, and state polities.”
1
 Stalwarts aim to protect state 
“sovereignty” or “autonomy”—spheres of immunity from federal regulation so 
that states can exercise decentralized political power.
2
 Traditional nationalists, 
by contrast, aim to centralize political power at the national level and are 
deeply skeptical of decentralized political power.
3
 
Gerken argues that federalism’s stalwarts and traditional nationalists both 
err insofar as each advocates a one-way ratchet: federalism stalwarts aim to 
devolve power to the states, whereas traditional nationalists want to centralize 
power at the federal level.
4
 Against these two approaches, Gerken christens 
“the new nationalist school of federalism,” whose core insight is that 
“devolution can further nationalist aims.”
5
 
For example, policy contestations at the local or state levels enable 
advocates on both sides to refine their positions and gather empirical evidence 
through experimentation, thereby teeing-up battles that may later occur on the 
national stage. Without the experiences gained at the local and state levels, 
policy battles at the national level would be hamstrung, if not impossible.
6
 A 
second way devolution may simultaneously advance nationalist aims, Gerken 
argues, is that the federal government may rely on states as implementers of 
federal policy.
7
 This is true of many federal statutory schemes—for example, 
Medicare, Medicaid, and the Affordable Care Act. States surely advance 
federal interests when implementing federal policy, but they also have 
opportunities to exercise substantial power, which can include negotiating with 
the federal government, and to achieve many of federalism’s well-catalogued 
benefits. 
Gerken plausibly argues that when acting in these teeing-up and 
implementation modalities, state power “rests on neither sovereignty nor 
 
 1. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 997, 1001 (2014) 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 1001–07. 
 6. See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 1, at 1026 (2014) (“Because we have a robust federal 
system, we aren’t forced to debate issues on an impossibly large national scale . . . [w]e aren’t 
fighting every fight on a national stage, with the winner taking all. Instead, we’re rehearsing those 
battles on a smaller scale in an iterative fashion and in a myriad of political contexts.”). 
 7. Id. at 1005. 
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autonomy.”
8
 So, Gerken introduces two alternative metaphors to capture the 
nature of the state power she describes and defends. The first is deliberately 
provocative: states have the “power of the servant” in a master/servant 
relationship with the federal government.
9
 Second, states are “agents” in a 
principal/agent relationship. The power of the servant is very real, though it 
“rests on informal influence as much as formal power.”
10
 And as to the 
principal/agent relationship, Gerken reminds us of the several fields of law, 
like corporate law, that presuppose that agents exercise substantial powers.
11
 
Gerken is idealistic, but not naïve: she hopes her nationalist school of 
federalism can lead to a détente of sorts between stalwart federalists and 
traditional nationalists, but she realizes there will remain much to fight over 
even if both sides adopt her framework. To be sure, Gerken’s nationalist 
school offers real attractions to federalism’s stalwarts—a descriptively 
accurate account under which states matter and exercise substantial power. But 
as the name “the nationalist school” suggests, Gerken’s account is 
predominantly nationalist in orientation: states are “servants” and “agents”; 
“there’s not much . . . left anymore” of “open regulatory space for the states to 
govern freely”;
12
 and “[t]he federal government can step in, one way or 
another, when the need arises.”
13
 Given its primarily nationalist orientation, I 
am uncertain whether Gerken’s account will satisfy stalwart federalists. 
But this Comment’s point is neither to predict how stalwart federalists will 
receive Gerken’s proposal, nor to persuade them one way or the other. Rather, 
it questions whether the system of federal/state relations Gerken describes 
really is fundamentally nationalist. Hence this Comment’s title: Gerken may be 
identifying a new model of governance, rather than a nationalist school whose 
moniker can safely presuppose the federal government’s present and ongoing 
centrality. 
To make these points, this Comment identifies, and then critically 
analyzes, what I take to be the three core propositions that drive Gerken’s 
argument. The first is that there is massive overlap between federal and state 
regulatory jurisdiction. Gerken’s second proposition—largely assumed, but 
central nonetheless—is that, as to that massive jurisdictional overlap, federal 
power is supreme over state power.
14
 Gerken’s third proposition follows from 
the first two: states operate as agents or servants of the federal government, 
 
 8. Id. at 1010. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 1022. 
 11. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1010. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 1006. 
 14. Together, the first two propositions account for Gerken’s descriptive claim that state 
power is not accurately captured by either ‘sovereignty’ or ‘autonomy.’ Id. at 1009–10. 
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insofar as (a) states are testing grounds for policy disputes that have not yet 
been, but in the future can be, resolved nationally, and (b) states act as 
implementers when the federal government elects to regulate but delegates 
enforcement power to them.
15
 To graphically summarize, Gerken’s argument 
can be represented as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part I endorses Gerken’s first proposition. Part I also contextualizes it, 
pointing to many other areas of law where initial expectations that power 
resided exclusively with one governmental institution have given way to 
overlapping powers between multiple institutions.
16
 In these other contexts, the 
shift from exclusivity to overlapping powers has come about due to a host of 
contingent factors. Similar considerations are present in the vertical federalism 
context and help explain why Proposition One is unsurprising and, probably, 
stable. 
Part II explores Proposition Two’s assumption that there is federal 
supremacy vis-à-vis the fields of massive jurisdictional overlap. Though 
constitutional text formally declares federal law to be supreme over state law, 
the contingent factors that have given rise to massive jurisdictional overlap 
suggest that formal supremacy need not translate to functional priority. Part II 
then explores ways that what I call “federal non-priority” might occur—and, I 
shall suggest, already has occurred in some regulatory fields. For these 
reasons, Part II suggests a friendly amendment to Gerken’s Proposition Two. I 
call it Proposition Two,* Contingent Federal Priority. 
Part III argues that the conjunction of Propositions One and Two* makes it 
necessary to also amend Proposition Three. Contingent federal priority means 
there is a broader array of potential relationships between the federal and state 
governments: the metaphors of agents and servants do not exhaust the 
possibilities. Part III makes a preliminary attempt at identifying additional 
models of federal/state relations. Further, there is no reason to expect that 
federal/state relations will be characterized by any single one of these at every 
 
 15. One of Gerken’s main points, to reiterate, is that agents and servants can, and do, 
exercise substantial power. Id. at 1010. 
 16. See Mark D. Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrence, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1051 (2010) 
(explaining this in detail). 
Professor Gerken’s Argument 
 Proposition 1: Massive Jurisdictional Overlap 
 + 
 Proposition 2:  Federal Supremacy 
 _______________________________ 
 → Proposition 3:  States as Agents / Servants 
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point in time. Instead, one field of law may be best characterized by one 
model, and another field of law by a different model. And that seems to most 
accurately describe the nature of federal/state relations today. The multiplicity 
of potential relations between the federal and state governments is why I resist 
Gerken’s language of a “nationalist school” and instead suggest the more 
neutral designation of the “new governancism.” 
In short, this Comment suggests that Professor Gerken’s argument should 
be modified as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I.  MASSIVE JURISDICTIONAL OVERLAP 
It is hard to dispute Proposition One: that there is massive overlap between 
the federal government’s and the states’ regulatory jurisdiction. States can, for 
instance, have immigration policies.
17
 And conversely, as Gerken persuasively 
shows, even in those fields most deeply associated with states—criminal law, 
family law, and education—there is significant federal regulation. Only 
slightly more controversial, though in my view correct, is Gerken’s descriptive 
claim that even following the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts’ efforts to prune 
back federal regulatory power, the federal government usually can get what it 
wants, one way or another. 
A historical analysis across multiple fields of constitutional law suggests 
that Proposition One—the phenomenon of massive regulatory overlap in the 
vertical federalism context—is not surprising. For it turns out that 
jurisdictional overlap among governmental institutions is very common, even 
where the Constitution allocates power to only one institution. After 
identifying eight such examples in Section A, the next four sections pinpoint 
numerous lessons these cases of jurisdictional overlap provide for vertical 
federalism. 
 
 17. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500, 2508 (2012) (“The pervasiveness of 
federal regulation does not diminish the importance of immigration policy to the States . . . . The 
federal scheme thus leaves room for a [state] policy requiring state officials to contact 
[Immigration and Customs Enforcement] as a routine matter.”). 
The New Governancism 
 Proposition One:  Massive Jurisdictional Overlap 
 + 
 Proposition Two*:  Contingent Federal Priority 
 _______________________________ 
 → Proposition Three*:  Multiple Possible Federal/State 
Relationships 
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A. Other Examples of Overlapping Jurisdiction 
Consider the following eight examples where two governmental 
institutions have overlapping jurisdiction: 
1. Between Judges and Juries: Although the Seventh Amendment grants 
juries the power to “tr[y] . . . fact[s]” “[i]n suits at common law,”
18
 federal 
judges today exercise substantial fact-finding powers when they issue directed 
verdicts, judgments as a matter of law, and summary judgments.
19
 
2. Between the Supreme Court and district courts: Although the 
Constitution states that “[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors . . . and those in 
which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original 
Jurisdiction,”
20
 inferior district courts also have original jurisdiction over cases 
brought by ambassadors and also in many cases brought by states.
21
 
3. Between the President/Senate and President/Congress: Although the 
Constitution specifies only one mechanism by which the United States can 
create international agreements—treaties, which are a joint creation of the 
President and Senate
22
—most recent international agreements have not been 
treaties, but are so-called congressional-executive agreements that are created 
by the ordinary legislation process.
23
 
4. Between Article III courts and Article I courts: Although Article III of 
the Constitution states that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish,”
24
 much adjudication concerning 
federal matters occurs in non-Article III federal courts.
25
 
5. Between the President and Congress: Although the Constitution states 
that “[t]he President . . . shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for 
Offenses against the United States,”
26
 Congress has “the power to pass acts of 
general amnesty”
27
—despite the fact that “[t]he distinction between amnesty 
and pardon is of no practical importance.”
28
 
 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 19. See Rosen, supra note 16, at 1080–87 (describing how the Seventh Amendment’s 
exclusivist scheme of jury fact-finding “was transformed into a system of concurrence”). 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 
21
. 
Rosen, supra note 16, at 1057–58. 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 23. Rosen, supra note 16, at 1059–60 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 25. Rosen, supra note 16, at 1058. 
 
26
. 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 
27
. 
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896). 
 28. Id. at 601–02. The Supreme Court noted that “[a]mnesty is defined by the 
lexicographers” to be a “general pardon for a past offense, and is rarely, if ever, exercised in favor 
of single individuals, and is usually exerted in behalf of certain classes of persons,” but the Court 
did not suggest that Congress could not grant amnesty to individuals. Id. To the contrary, the 
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6. Between Congress and Agencies: Although the Constitution provides 
that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States,”
29
 most scholars agree that administrative agencies have broad 
discretion to generate regulations that are functionally indistinguishable from 
statutes.
30
 
7. Between Congress and Federal Courts: Although Congress has the 
power to enact laws relating to admiralty
31
 and to govern interstate disputes,
32
 
there also is a “tradition of federal common lawmaking in admiralty,”
33
 as well 
as a “federal common law of nuisance” regarding interstate waters.
34
 
8. Between the Sister States (horizontal federalism): Though it originally 
was thought that “no state . . . can, by its laws, directly affect or bind property 
out of its own territory, or bind persons not resident therein,”
35
 today’s 
restatements and model codes acknowledge that states can apply their laws 
extraterritorially, and the Supreme Court has observed that “a set of facts 
giving rise to a lawsuit, or a particular issue within a lawsuit, may justify, in 
constitutional terms, application of the law of more than one jurisdiction.”
36
 
B. From Exclusivity to Overlap 
In almost all the above overlap-relationships, the Supreme Court’s first 
view was that only one institution had power—the one institution to which the 
Constitution explicitly granted the power.
37
 So, for example, the Supreme 
Court long asserted that only juries could find facts,
38
 “[t]hat Congress cannot 
 
Brown Court approved of an earlier case that upheld the secretary of the treasury’s power to remit 
a penalty against a single steam vessel on the ground that this constituted an exercise of the 
pardon power and explained that “the power vested in the President [is] not exclusive.” Id. at 601. 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 30. See Rosen, supra note 16, at 1099–1103 (discussing the Courts reluctance to part with 
the “myth of exclusivity” as it relates to agency power). 
 
31
. 
S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917) (“Congress has paramount power to fix 
and determine the maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country.”). 
 
32
. 
See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 101–02 (1972) (discussing Congressional 
lawmaking concerning interstate waters). 
 33. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994). 
 34. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 107. 
 35. Mark D. Rosen, Religious Institutions, Liberal States, and the Political Architecture of 
Overlapping Spheres, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 737, 750 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 18, 20 (1834)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 36. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981); Rosen, supra note 35, at 751. 
 37. An exception was horizontal jurisdiction, where the Constitution did not make an 
explicit allocation. 
 38. E.g., Baylis v. Travellers’ Ins. Co., 113 U.S. 316, 320–21 (1885) (“[T]he court errs if it 
substitutes itself for the jury, and, passing upon the effect of the evidence, finds the facts involved 
in the issue, and renders judgment thereon.”); see also Rosen, supra note 16, at 1082–83 
(discussing Baylis). 
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delegate legislative power to the President,”
39
 and that only Article III courts 
could exercise the “judicial power” of the United States.
40
 
The Court’s initial expectation is not surprising, insofar as expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius—the principle that “to express or include one thing 
implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative”
41
—is a natural way to 
interpret a legal text like the Constitution. And further—as James Madison 
argued during the Pacificus-Helvidius debates concerning the question of 
whether President Washington had power to issue a neutrality proclamation—
the idea that two institutions have power to “perform the same function” may 
be thought to be “as awkward in practice, as it is unnatural in theory.”
42
 
But though expressio unius est exclusio alterius may seem natural, and 
jurisdictional overlap “awkward” and “unnatural,” neither position is logically 
axiomatic. It is possible, after all, that constitutional text could make an initial 
allocation of power that thereafter may be altered, for example by delegation.
43
 
Or that a second governmental institution might have explicit or implied 
powers that coincide with those the Constitution explicitly grants the first. 
(Alexander Hamilton made just this argument in the Pacificus-Helvidius 
debate, and President Washington relied upon Hamilton’s approach when he 
issued the Neutrality Proclamation, in which he interpreted a treaty with 
France notwithstanding the fact that Congress’ power to declare war 
encompassed the power to interpret the treaty with France).
44
 
More generally, the eight examples provided above—and there are many 
others—are instances where expressio unius est exclusio alterius was not 
determinative, and initial expectations of jurisdictional exclusivity gave way to 
jurisdictional overlap.
45
 But how does this happen? And why? 
 
 39. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892); see also Rosen, supra note 16, 
at 1098–99 (discussing Marshall Field & Co.) 
 40. See Rosen, supra note 16, at 1093–97. 
 41. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (9th ed. 2009). 
 42. JAMES MADISON, HELVIDIUS NUMBER II (1793), reprinted in ALEXANDER HAMILTON 
& JAMES MADISON, THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793–1794: TOWARD THE 
COMPLETION OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 65, 69 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007). Madison’s full 
quotation reads as follows: [T]he same specific function or act, cannot possibly belong to the two 
departments and be separately exerciseable by each. . . . A concurrent authority in two 
independent departments to perform the same function with respect to the same thing, would be 
as awkward in practice, as it is unnatural in theory. Id. at 68–69. 
 43. See Rosen, supra note 16, at 1066–68 (discussing “plausible textual arguments” for 
delegation). 
 44. See id. at 1073-76 (discussing the Pacificus-Helvidius debates). 
 45. As I observed in an earlier article, “[p]robably nowhere else has Madison’s view of the 
basic architecture of American constitutionalism proven to be so wrong.” Id. at 1053. 
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C. Constitutional Construction Outside the Supreme Court 
Perhaps because expressio unius est exclusio alterius and jurisdictional 
exclusivity are the more natural conclusions reached during the relatively 
formal activity of interpreting legal texts, the shift from jurisdictional 
exclusivity to jurisdictional overlap tends to be initiated by institutions ‘in the 
trenches,’ not high appellate courts. 
For example, lower courts and legislatures began expanding the 
circumstances where cases could be kept from juries for lack of evidence and 
first authorized district court judges to issue judgments without (or, 
alternatively, contrary to) a jury’s determination;
46
 the Supreme Court 
originally resisted, but ultimately relented.
47
 For another example, Congress 
delegated legislative-like powers to administrative agencies, notwithstanding 
cases declaring delegations to be impermissible.
48
 And when Congress stopped 
declaring war in the middle of the twentieth century, the President began 
introducing troops to the theater of war on his own.
49
 
D. Functional Considerations 
Functional factors—not formal considerations such as a legal text’s 
wording—seem to account for the shift from jurisdictional exclusivity to 
jurisdictional overlap. Elsewhere I have catalogued seven such considerations: 
1. Efficiency: For example, allowing federal judges to issue verdicts 
contrary to a jury’s, despite the jury’s power to find facts, seems to have been 
motivated by the goal of saving “the valuable time of the court, jury, and 
parties.”
50
 
2. Necessity: For example, the Supreme Court approved a non-Article III 
procedure for collecting federal taxes on the ground that “[i]mperative 
necessity has forced a distinction between such claims and all others.”
51
 
3. Pragmatics: For example, the Court has explained that the non-
delegation doctrine’s allowance of delegation “has been driven by a practical 
understanding that in our increasingly complex society . . . Congress simply 
 
 46. See id. at 1081–87 (discussing the erosion of exclusivity in American jurisprudence). 
 47. See id. at 1085–86 (discussing Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) and 
Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935)). 
 48. See id. at 1098–1105 (discussing the contemporary “myth of exclusivity” and 
Congressional delegation). 
 49. Though Congress ultimately exercises a check through appropriations, this is not 
equivalent to Congress making the initial determination of whether the United States should go to 
war insofar as the presence of American troops abroad typically operates as a thumb on the scales 
in favor of appropriations. 
 50. Rosen, supra note 16, at 1125–28. 
 51. See id. at 1124 (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 
272, 281 (1855)). 
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cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power.”
52
 Similarly, the Court 
explained the constitutionality of a statute vesting original jurisdiction in 
district courts over lawsuits filed by ambassadors, though the Constitution 
provides that “the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction” in “all Cases 
affecting Ambassadors,”
53
 on pragmatic grounds: 
[K]eep[ing] open the highest court of the nation for the determination, in the 
first instance, of suits involving . . . a diplomatic or commercial representative 
of a foreign government . . . . was due to the rank and dignity of those for 
whom the [constitutional] provision was made; but to . . . deprive an 
ambassador, public minister or consul of the privilege of suing in any court he 
chose having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of his action, 
would be, in many cases, to convert what was intended as a favor into a 
burden.
54
 
4. Circumstances unanticipated by the Founders: For example, the Court 
has justified the constitutionality of non-Article III territorial courts on the 
Founders’ failure to anticipate that Congress would have to create interim 
courts in territories before they became states. If such courts counted as Article 
III courts, then the judges would have life tenure—resulting in an unwelcome 
surfeit of judges after newly admitted states created their own judiciaries.
55
 
5. Workarounds where the institution explicitly tasked by the Constitution 
has not acted:
56
 The Supreme Court has not explicitly invoked this 
consideration to justify jurisdictional overlap, but some scholars have. For 
example, Professors Bruce Ackerman and David Golove have defended the 
treaty-substitute known as presidential-congressional agreements on the 
ground that the Senate problematically failed to create treaties.
57
 And 
defenders of presidential initiatives in deploying the armed forces explain it as 
a justifiable response to Congress’s failure to responsibly exercise its 
constitutional power to declare war. Justice Jackson’s famed dictum in his 
concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure Case that unexercised congressional 
 
 52. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); see also Rosen, supra note 16, 
1123–24 (“[T]he same confluence of practical considerations that dictated the result in [Chief 
Justice Marshall’s opinion in the Canter case] has governed the decisions in later cases 
sanctioning the creation of other courts with judges of limited tenure and that otherwise do not 
conform to the requirements of Article III.” (quoting Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 547 
(1962) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 53. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 54. Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 464 (1884); see also Rosen, supra note 16, at 1121–23 
(discussing Ames). 
 55. Glidden, 370 U.S. at 545–47. 
 56. See Rosen, supra note 16, at 1129–30 (discussing concurrence as a workaround). 
 57. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
799, 861–96 (1995) (describing the conflict that arose between isolationists and internationalists 
prior to and during World War II as the result of the Senate’s “monopoly” on foreign policy). 
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power is likely to be filled by presidential initiative
58
 is a rare instance where a 
Supreme Court Justice has acknowledged this force behind jurisdictional 
overlap. 
6. Where there are institutional synergies between two institutions, such 
that overlapping jurisdiction leads to better results than exclusivity likely 
would:
59
 For example, the Court in United States v. Midwest Oil Co. upheld a 
presidential proclamation withdrawing petroleum extraction rights, despite the 
fact that Congress could have amended the statute that permitted such 
extraction so as to withdraw those rights. As Midwest Oil explained, “rules or 
laws for the disposal of public land are necessarily general in their nature,” and 
“[e]mergencies may occur, or conditions may so change as to require that the 
agent in charge should, in the public interest, withhold the land from sale.”
60
 If 
the President did not act, a suboptimal outcome would have resulted. 
The aim of harnessing institutional synergies also helps account for federal 
common law and dormant commerce clause doctrine
61
—court-created law that 
Congress had the power to, but did not, generate. As I have explained 
elsewhere, the “phenomenon of courts taking the first step may occur in fields 
that are better-suited to inductive, ground-up reasoning than the legislature’s 
more deductive process of laying down prospective general principles.”
62
 
Congress always has the power to modify the court-created federal common 
law. 
7. Emergencies:
63
 For example, the Court in Midwest Oil justified the 
president’s overlapping power to terminate extraction rights on the grounds of 
emergency.
64
 And in Block v. Hirsh, the Court upheld an administrative 
agency’s assumption of jury fact-finding duties on the ground that remedying 
 
 58. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“But I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep power in the hands 
of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its problems. A crisis that challenges the 
President equally, or perhaps primarily, challenges Congress. If not good law, there was worldly 
wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that ‘The tools belong to the man who can use 
them.’ We may say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but 
only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers.”). 
 59. See Rosen, supra note 16, at 1131–33 (discussing interinstitutional synergies and 
concurrence). 
 60. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915). 
 61. Rosen, supra note 16, at 1132–33. The fifth function factor (‘workarounds’ where the 
explicitly tasked institution has not acted) also is frequently operative here. 
 62. Id. at 1132. 
 63. Id. at 1133–34. 
 64. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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the “exigency” of a housing shortage required fast action that only 
administrative fact-finding could accomplish.
65
 
E. Two Variables Concerning Overlap 
Two additional variables must be mentioned if the reader is to have a full 
and proper understanding of this nation’s practice of jurisdictional overlap. 
1. Enduring Exclusivity 
First, while the movement toward jurisdictional overlap is a strong pattern, 
it is not inexorable. “[M]any of the Constitution’s power allocations still are 
understood exclusively.”
66
 This is unsurprising insofar as functional, rather 
than formal, considerations best account for the rise of jurisdictional overlap. 
After all, the extent to which one or more of the above-discussed functional 
considerations giving rise to overlap is present is highly context-specific. 
2. Varying Relationships Among the Institutions with Overlapping 
Jurisdiction 
Second, even where there is jurisdictional overlap among institutions, there 
is an array of relationships between the institutions. On one side of the 
spectrum, consider the judge/jury relationship: though judges exercise fact-
finding powers when they issue Rule 50 motions for judgment as a matter of 
law, juries still play the predominant fact-finding role in federal litigation. The 
judge/jury relationship accordingly may be described as a circumstance of 
“Unsurprising Priority”—‘unsurprising’ in the sense that the institution 
allocated power by the formal legal materials plays the primary role. At the 
other extreme, most of the rules concerning admiralty and interstate disputes 
are court-created federal common law, notwithstanding Congress’s explicit 
constitutional authority to regulate such matters. Label this “Surprising 
Priority”—‘surprising’ insofar as the institution to which the Constitution 
formally allocates power does not play the primary governing role. Between 
the two poles of Unsurprising and Surprising Priority lies what might be called 
“Partnership”—a circumstance where both institutions play an important 
governing role. A good example of Partnership is the Congress/Agency 
relationship. 
  
 
 65. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158 (1921) (“A part of the exigency is to secure a speedy 
and summary administration of the law and we are not prepared to say that the suspension of 
ordinary remedies was not a reasonable provision of a statute reasonable in its aim and intent.”). 
 66. Rosen, supra note 16, at 1109. For some examples, see id. at 1109–10. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] THE NEW GOVERNANCISM? 1091 
Table A provides a simplified graphic depiction of the range of possible 
relationships between institutions with overlapping jurisdiction: 
 
 
 
To be sure, there are many possible criteria that could be said to be 
relevant to determining where on the spectrum a particular overlap-relationship 
belongs. Two likely candidates are how extensively each institution acts 
pursuant to its jurisdiction, and whether one institution has the power to 
formally trump the other. Since these, and other relevant considerations, are 
unlikely to be strictly commensurable, there is no single uncontroversial way 
to determine precisely where on the continuum a particular overlap 
relationship objectively should be situated. While this is true, it need not 
concern us now. All that matters is the recognition that all overlap relationships 
are not the same. And I think that even the relatively crude, highly qualitative 
diagnostic tool I’ve provided above facilitates recognition of this important 
fact. 
With these caveats in mind, Table B provides my ballpark estimates as to 
where each of the overlap-relationships identified in Part I.A lies on the 
relationship continuum, along with brief explanations as to why: 
  
TABLE A:  RANGE OF POSSIBLE OVERLAP-RELATIONSHIPS 
Unsurprising Priority ↔ Partnership ↔ Surprising Priority 
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In short, many different relationships can be found among the institutions 
that have overlapping jurisdiction. Such diversity is not startling, for the same 
reason there remain domains where a single institution has exclusive 
jurisdiction: overlapping jurisdiction generally is a result of functional 
considerations that inevitably are context-specific. 
F. Implications Vis-à-vis Vertical Federalism 
How are the foregoing overlap-relationships relevant to our subject of 
vertical federalism? To begin, the degree of jurisdictional overlap is 
TABLE B 
Unsurprising Priority ↔ Partnership ↔ Surprising Priority 
 (5) (1) (6) (4) (8) (7) (3) (2) 
Legend and brief explanation: 
 
(1) = overlap between Judge/Jury: explained above. 
(2) = overlap between district courts/Supreme Court original jurisdiction (in cases 
brought by ambassadors and by states against parties that are not states): most of these 
cases today are brought in district court. 
(3) = overlap between congressional-executive agreements and treaties: most 
international agreements today are created by congressional-executive agreements. 
(4) = overlap between Article III and Article I courts: substantial litigation occurs in 
both contexts. 
(5) = overlap between President’s pardon power and Congress’ amnesty power: 
virtually all pardons come from the President. 
(6) = overlap between Congress and Administrative Agencies: both entities are 
extremely important as a practical matter, though Congress has formal trumping and 
supervisory power that it not infrequently exercises. 
(7) = overlap between Congress’ powers over interstate controversies and admiralty 
and Courts’ federal common law powers: mostly federal common law and Congress 
seldom exercises its formal trumping power.  
(8) = overlap between states’ powers (horizontal federalism): there is substantial 
overlap between the states’ regulatory powers, with the result that many matters can be 
regulated by more than one state. 
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remarkable. Though Hume’s Law quite rightly instructs that “is” does not on 
its own imply “ought”
67
—meaning that the mere fact that so much 
jurisdictional overlap has evolved does not make it a good thing—so 
widespread a pattern in a generally well-functioning constitutional democracy, 
in conjunction with an appreciation of the factors that have given rise to the 
jurisdictional overlap, strongly suggest that jurisdictional overlap is a 
beneficial governance technique.
68
 As a purely descriptive matter, the 
widespread phenomenon of jurisdictional overlap observed in Part I makes 
Proposition One—massive jurisdictional overlap between the federal and state 
governments—less surprising than it otherwise might appear. Other 
implications are that massive jurisdictional overlap likely is a stable 
phenomenon, and that efforts to work against it may be Sisyphean. To translate 
these lessons to the federal context, the effort to define distinct spheres of 
federal and state regulatory authority—a project pursued by many of 
federalism’s stalwarts under the banner of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘autonomy’—may 
be doomed. 
II.  CONTINGENT FEDERAL PRIORITY 
The rest of this Comment applies other insights from the other overlap-
relationships explored in Part I to vertical federalism. Part II focuses on 
Proposition Two of federal supremacy, and Part III addresses Proposition 
Three—that states are servants and agents of the federal government. 
A. Priority Versus Supremacy 
There is one important difference between vertical federalism and other 
contexts of jurisdictional overlap: only in vertical federalism is there 
constitutional text—the Supremacy Clause—proclaiming one of the 
institutions supreme. The force of this distinction is blunted by overlap-
relationships that qualify as Surprising Priority where the Constitution creates 
only one of the institutions in the overlap-relationship. After all, it might be 
assumed that the constitutionally-created institution would always have 
priority—yet it does not. Further, the constitutionally-created institution does 
not necessarily have priority (as a descriptive matter) even where it is formally 
supreme as a matter of black letter law. This is the case, for example, with the 
Congress/Agency relationship, which falls in the Partnership range of the 
spectrum. Accordingly, the absence of constitutional text proclaiming 
Congress supreme to agencies does not render that overlap-relationship 
irrelevant to vertical federalism. 
 
 67. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, book III, part I, §1, at 469–70. 
 68. See Rosen, supra note 16, at 1140–49 (developing the normative argument for 
jurisdictional overlap). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1094 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1079 
To put it differently, there is an important difference between supremacy 
and priority. “Supremacy” is a formal legal concept that determines which 
institution trumps in circumstances where two act in inconsistent ways, 
whereas “priority” is a phenomenological description that captures a 
comparative measure of the practical importance of the two institutions. 
Formal supremacy likely is one component in a priority assessment, though it 
possibly could become virtually irrelevant in some circumstances.
69
 Insofar as 
jurisdictional overlap is primarily shaped by functional rather than formal 
considerations, it is sensible to assess it not only though formal legal analysis 
(such as determining which institution has supremacy), but also through 
functional measures (such as determining each institution’s relative priority).
70
 
B. Factors Giving Rise to Federal/State Overlap 
So what lessons from the overlap-relationships examined in Part I might 
carry over to vertical federalism? A starting hypothesis is that some or all the 
factors that gave rise to jurisdictional overlap in those contexts may be 
operative in vertical federalism. For example, notwithstanding formal federal 
supremacy, states may exercise power where it is believed that overlapping 
jurisdiction (1) generates efficiencies, (2) addresses necessities, (3) responds to 
emergencies, or (4) promises other pragmatic benefits. Further, states can be 
expected to exercise power to (5) fill lacunae where the federal government 
has not acted, and where there are (6) institutional synergies between state and 
federal power. 
In fact, almost all these considerations have led to overlapping jurisdiction, 
where states exercised power that could have been solely exercised by the 
(formally supreme) federal government. For instance, the federal government 
relied upon non-federal actors to enforce the Brady Act’s provisions governing 
gun registration for an array of pragmatic reasons that fall under the first four 
factors: it was going to take some time to get federal enforcers up and going, 
and Congress did not want to delay the Act’s implementation.
71
 As to the fifth 
factor, federal inaction in immigration reform has left room for, and thus led, 
some states to step in to formulate immigration policies of their own. And 
Congress’s decision to rely heavily on states for implementing the Health Care 
Act likely was driven by the sixth factor: because states know local conditions 
better than the federal government, tailored implementation by states may be 
 
 69. I shall not fully defend this point in this Comment, though its potential validity is 
implicit in much of what follows. 
 70. I expect Professor Gerken would agree, given her interest in assessing the actual power 
exercised by states, even when that power is the result of informal mechanisms. 
 71. The Court invalidated this part of the Brady Act in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 
(1997). 
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more efficient and states can better respond to differing local needs and 
sensibilities, than centralized implementation can.
72
 
C. The Contingency of Priority 
The recognition that multiple factors give rise to jurisdictional overlap 
generates many interesting lessons. First, the degree of jurisdictional overlap in 
the vertical federalism context is likely to be contingent on variables that have 
no relationship to the Constitution’s language. For instance, efficiency 
considerations can be expected to turn on such things as whether states have 
prior experience in an arena Congress elects to regulate, and whether pre-
existing state institutions can implement the federal law. If so, avoiding costly 
and unnecessary duplication is a reason to rely on states rather than creating a 
new federal implementing body. Another contingent variable determining the 
degree of jurisdictional overlap is how well, or poorly, the federal government 
works. For example, congressional dysfunction that leaves important matters 
unregulated or unfixed may result in states ‘stepping into the breach.’ 
Further, the fact that multiple factors determine the degree of jurisdictional 
overlap suggests several possible dynamics. First, there might be healthful 
shifts over time in the degree of jurisdictional overlap. To illustrate, rising 
population and growing heterogeneity may impact the value of the synergies 
between the federal and state governments. For instance, increasing population 
and growing homogeneity may increase the desirability of differentiated 
implementation of certain federal programs across the country, favoring 
reliance on states. On the other hand, the same factors may lead to the opposite 
conclusion with respect to other federal programs: a uniform, centralized 
approach may be preferable to fight against a growing national fragmentation. 
The point for present purposes is not to definitively determine when changes 
such as our nation’s growing population push in favor of more or less 
jurisdictional overlap, but to suggest that (1) some jurisdictional shift over time 
is both expected and desirable, and (2) the direction of the shift may be policy-
specific, rather than trans-substantively oriented toward one direction. 
An awareness that multiple factors account for the degree of jurisdictional 
overlap also suggests there can be unhealthy dynamics. For one, jurisdictional 
overlap can create a moral hazard. For example, the federal government’s 
knowledge that states may step in if it does not act might lessen the perceived 
urgency of federal action, contributing to federal dysfunction. Perhaps this 
dynamic is partly at play in the current immigration impasse in Washington. 
Second, jurisdictional overlap can lead to two types of suboptimal, first-
mover entrenchments—what we might call “pragmatic entrenchment” and 
 
 72. The first factor, efficiency, likely also played a role insofar as the states had institutional 
infrastructures that could be deployed to help implement the Act. 
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“conceptual entrenchment.” As to pragmatic entrenchment, the first-mover 
might generate a set of institutions and learned experience that make 
jurisdictional change inefficient, expensive, or otherwise pragmatically 
unlikely despite the fact that, all things considered, the other institution is 
better situated at this time to discharge a particular task. Conceptual 
entrenchment refers to the possibility that the first-moving institution might 
displace a political culture’s ability to perceive that a particular task could be 
discharged by the other institution. Logic suggests the federal government can 
be either the beneficiary or victim of both forms of entrenchment, depending 
on whether the federal government or the states were the first-movers.
73
 And 
the contemporary costs of either entrenchment are independent of the 
normativity of the first-mover’s action at the time it originally acted.
74
 
It might be useful to offer some suggestions of entrenchment. Since this 
Section addresses the contingency of federal priority, I will explore two arenas 
where states may have become entrenched.
75
 And a caveat: though any 
examples will be controversial insofar as they suggest that regulatory domains 
long associated with the states may be more properly the responsibility of the 
federal government, I will not be able to fully defend in this Comment the 
proposition that either of the two example I offer ought to be federalized. The 
goal, instead, is to enhance the plausibility of my claim that these two types of 
entrenchment might occur. 
First, education long has been the primary domain of states and localities, 
and to this day there remains a wide consensus that this is normatively correct 
and should continue.
76
 But arguments for educational decentralization are 
weakened insofar as “Americans move a great deal.”
77
 For example, 43.4 
million Americans moved in a representative one-year period—approximately 
sixteen percent of the entire country—a large percentage of which were to 
 
 73. It follows that the states, too, can be either victims or beneficiaries of each form of 
entrenchment. 
 74. That is to say, there can be entrenchment costs whether (a) the first-mover was the 
proper institution to have acted when it did, but is no longer proper due to changing 
circumstances, or (b) the first-mover was never the normatively preferred institution, but simply 
was an effective first-mover. 
 75. As indicated above, the federal government sometimes may be the first-mover and hence 
the beneficiary of one or both types of entrenchment. 
 76. A crucial passage in United States v. Lopez is characteristic of this, assuming without 
argument state priority in education. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) 
(“Under the theories that the Government presents in support of [the Brady Act], it is difficult to 
perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or 
education where States historically have been sovereign.”). 
 77. Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1607 (2005). 
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homes in different school districts.
78
 The forces of nationalization and 
globalization further reduce the extent to which a child’s educational needs are 
determined by local circumstances, as does education’s long association with 
our national commitment to being a country of equal opportunity. This is not to 
suggest there are no valid contemporary arguments for decentralized education 
in the United States.
79
 But the dogma that education is local has been virtually 
unchallenged in this country, and the dearth of its reconsideration may at least 
in part be due to the pragmatic and conceptual entrenchment that has resulted 
from states having been first-movers in this domain. 
The second example of possible first-mover entrenchment comes from the 
field of conflicts-of-law, the body of law that determines which state’s law 
applies when activities straddle multiple states. It long has been understood by 
scholars that the Constitution gives Congress the power to enact a federal body 
of conflict-of-laws rules.
80
 Early Congresses recognized this as well.
81
 But 
Congress left this power largely unexercised, with the result that almost the 
entire field has been created by state courts and has come to be viewed as 
having the status of state law.
82
 
Courts and scholars alike have recognized for a century that choice-of-law 
is a chaotic mess.
83
 But almost nobody has considered that the source of the 
problem may be that only federal law can provide what a rational body of 
choice-of-law requires.
84
 In short, choice-of-law is an area where states as first-
movers may have led to a conceptual entrenchment of state law. State law has 
priority in choice-of-law notwithstanding formal federal supremacy, and 
despite powerful conceptual and practical reasons for federal law to have 
priority.
85
 
 
 78. Id. Forty-four percent of the moves were to homes in another county. Id. Many of the 
fifty-six percent intra-county moves likely were to homes in different school districts, for most 
counties have tens of school districts. See id. 
 79. Consider, for example, the claim that decentralization works against a totalitarian state 
where the federal government alone determined what children learned. 
 80. See Mark D. Rosen, Choice-of-Law as Non-Constitutional Federal Law, 99 MINN. L. 
REV. 1017, 1093–95 (2015) (discussing the source of congressional authority to enact choice-of-
law rules). 
 81. Id. at 1093. 
 82. See id. at 1040–47 (explaining Joseph Beale’s reconceptualization of choice-of-law as 
state law). 
 83. Id. at 1019. 
 84. Id. at 1021 (explaining that “while choice-of-law presupposes variations across states in 
the substantive law to which it applies, choice-of-law cannot effectively serve its managerial 
function of predictably determining which state’s law applies if choice-of-law itself varies across 
states”). 
 85. See Rosen, supra note 80, at 1075–93 (explaining why choice-of-law is best understood 
as having the status of federal law). 
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III.  MULTIPLE POSSIBLE FEDERAL/STATE RELATIONSHIPS 
As a consequence of the contingency of federal priority (Proposition 
Two*), there is a wide range of possible federal/state relationships that may 
arise (Proposition Three*) over the domain of massive regulatory overlap 
between the federal and state governments (Proposition One). Professor 
Gerken is quite right in identifying two surprising, non-standard metaphors for 
federal/state (states as servants and states as agents), and in arguing that states 
can exercise substantial power in both these capacities. But the contingency of 
federal priority means there are many other possible federal/state relationships. 
This Part III aims to identify this range of possibilities by drawing on lessons 
that arise from the overlap-relationships identified in Part I. 
A. The Range of Possible Federal/State Relationships 
Let us start by revisiting the range of possible relationships between 
institutions with overlapping jurisdiction that we examined in Part I, but fitting 
it to the context of vertical federalism: 
 
 
 
 
 
The main point of Professor Gerken’s two metaphors is that states can 
exercise substantial and meaningful power, despite their not having formal 
supremacy. Gerken’s position can be mapped onto Table C’s Range of 
Possible Federal/State Relationships. Her first metaphor, the “Principal/Agent 
relationship,” can be graphically translated as indicating that states may be 
located anywhere from “D” to “G” when they serve as agents to the federal 
government. In fact, the Range of Possible Federal/State Relationships graph 
facilitates recognition that the Principal/Agent metaphor can be further 
subdivided. Some federal statutes have very specific mandates that leave states 
little discretionary room. In such circumstances, states may be said to act as 
“Directed Agents,” and the federal/state relationship would fall somewhere 
around “D.” Other statutes utilize broad standards and other methods for 
giving states more implementation leeway. States may be said to serve as 
“Trusted Delegees” in such circumstances, and the federal/state relationship 
would fall closer to “G.” 
Professor Gerken’s essay identifies another type of federal/state 
relationship. She notes that states can serve as battlegrounds of issues that are 
later fought out on the national stage. This is another type of partnership 
relationship, in the sense that states play a surprisingly important role in a 
domain over which there is formal federal supremacy, though this state role 
ultimately gives way to federal priority. Call this the “Teeing-Up” relationship. 
TABLE C:  RANGE OF POSSIBLE FEDERAL/STATE RELATIONSHIPS 
Unsurprising Federal Priority ↔ Partnership ↔ Surprising State Priority 
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What might be some other possible relationships between the federal and 
state governments? Toward the pole of Unsurprising Federal Priority (from 
“A” to “B”) are instances where the federal government fully or largely 
preempts state law and relies exclusively on federal agencies to enforce the 
law. Patent and copyright belong here. Even here the role of the state may not 
be wholly displaced—for example, state trade secrets law can be viewed as a 
supplement to federal intellectual property law. But the federal government has 
priority. Let’s call this “Federal Priority.” 
At the other end of the spectrum (toward “I” and “J”) are instances where 
states have surprising priority notwithstanding formal federal supremacy. 
Choice-of-law is such an example: it is almost exclusively state-law driven, 
and the few instances of federal law have the intention and effect of enhancing, 
rather than displacing, coordination among state officials.
86
 Call this “State 
Priority.” Only slightly to the left—in the range of “G” and “H”—is a 
federal/state relationship that might be called the “Federal Enforcer,” where the 
federal government approves agreements made by states concerning matters 
that could have been regulated by the federal government. A good example is 
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, a federal 
law that authorized an interstate agreement concerning articles of interstate 
commerce that could have been regulated by Congress.
87
 
Another possible federal/state relationship, located in the “E”–“G” range 
but distinguishable from Principal/Agent, might be called the “Joint Venture.” 
In this circumstance, federal regulation does not fully preempt state law, 
leaving each government’s regulatory jurisdiction intact. Federal and state 
governments operate independently, though they sometimes may coordinate. 
Examples include the law of unfair trade practices and parts of discrimination 
law. 
Finally, let us consider Professor Gerken’s second metaphor, the “Power of 
the Servant.” It does not describe a distinct type of federal/state relationship, 
but instead serves as a gloss on the entire range of relationships. The Power of 
the Servant draws on the intellectual tradition flowing from Hegel’s famed 
master/slave dialectic, which undermines the stability and integrity of formal 
power asymmetries. We might translate the implications of the Power of the 
Servant to our context of vertical federalism in two complementary ways. First, 
 
 86. See Welch-Doden v. Roberts, 42 P.3d 1166, 1171–73 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing 
states’ adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), problems with the Act 
that led Congress to enact the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), and the follow-up 
uniform law known as the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) 
which, with the assistance of the PKPA, now operates to resolve choice-of-law questions 
concerning child custody). 
 87. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 190 (1992) (White, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the act was a “congressional sanction of interstate compromise [the states] had reached”). 
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the federal government’s election to govern in conjunction with states matters 
that the federal government has formally supreme power to govern alone 
empowers the states, and in so doing creates risks from the vantage point of the 
federal government. Second, from the perspective of the states, the lesson of 
the Power of the Servant is that states may be able to exercise greater power 
than would be expected in each and every one of the possible federal/state 
relationships.
88
 
For example, Gerken’s observation that states in the Principal/Agent 
relationship may have de facto power to negotiate with the federal 
government
89
 is a manifestation of the Power of the Servant, and suggests that 
Principal/Agent may extend to the range of H (and perhaps even beyond that). 
Recent state experiments with de-criminalizing marijuana, though its use and 
sale remain formally prohibited under federal law, may be another 
manifestation of the Power of the Servant. Finally, the Affordable Care Act’s 
heavy reliance on states—something that could have been avoided (for 
instance through a single payer system)—has ceded substantial control over 
the Act’s effective implementation to the states. 
To summarize, the abovementioned examples of federal/state relationships 
might be graphically depicted as follows: 
  
 
 88. Indeed, Gerken’s recognition of the Power of the Servant is a powerful reason internal to 
her own account for revisiting the descriptor of “the new nationalism.” 
 89. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1025. 
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One final note: the Power of the Servant suggests the possibility that the 
entire list of possible federal/state relationships (except Federal Priority) may 
be subject to a rightward shift towards Surprising State Priority in some 
circumstances. 
B. Some Implications 
I do not purport to have exhausted the types of federal/state relationships 
over the domain of regulatory overlap. My point instead was to illustrate that 
there are a large number of possible relationships and to provide a sense of the 
range of possibilities—something conveyed (I hope) by the distance between 
Unsurprising Federal Priority and Surprising State Priority. It would be 
illuminating in future work to identify other federal/state relationships and to 
more fully flesh out their contours. 
An interesting implication of Section A’s discussion is that there is no a 
priori reason to think there is, or should be, a single prototypical federal/state 
relationship across the domain of overlapping jurisdiction. To the contrary, as a 
descriptive matter, there are different federal/state relationships in the 
subdomains of jurisdictional overlap; the federal government has priority in 
some areas of regulatory overlap, and states have priority in others. Such 
variations are unsurprising in light of the context-specific factors that account 
for overlapping jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, because context-specific factors determine whether there is 
overlapping jurisdiction and what form it takes, there is no reason to expect a 
convergence over time to one overlap-relationship. The multiplicity of 
federal/state relationships may be a reason to ratchet down the rhetoric when 
we confront disputes about the appropriate federal and state roles in particular 
contests, insofar as skirmishes in one subdomain do not necessarily—and 
indeed generally do not appear to—carry over to the entire domain of 
TABLE D:  RANGE OF POSSIBLE FEDERAL/STATE RELATIONSHIPS 
Unsurprising Federal Priority ↔ Partnership ↔ Surprising State Priority 
Federal Priority State Priority 
 Directed Agent 
 Trusted Delegee 
 Federal Enforcer 
 Teeing-Up 
 Joint Venture 
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overlapping jurisdiction. Put differently, there is reason to think that vertical 
federalism presents not a giant slippery slope, but a series of context-specific 
decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
The massive jurisdictional overlap between the federal and state 
governments likely is a stable enduring phenomenon of contemporary 
governance. This does not mean the states are meaningless, powerless, or 
irrelevant. To the contrary, they exercise power in many unexpected ways, and 
sometimes have functional priority notwithstanding the federal government’s 
formal supremacy. 
While Professor Gerken is correct that decentralization of power to the 
states can further national ends, it need not. There is a wide range of possible 
relationships between the federal and state governments—for instance, Federal 
Priority, Directed Agent, Trusted Delegee, Teeing-Up, Join Venture, Federal 
Enforcer, and State Priority—and there is no reason to expect that the 
relationship will take only one of these forms across the entire domain of 
overlapping federal/state jurisdiction. For these reasons, Professor Gerken’s 
illuminating essay may better be said to be describing a system of 
governancism rather than a “nationalist school of federalism” whose very 
name seems to presuppose the federal government’s present and continued 
centrality. The massive contingency entailed by our system of governancism—
the vast array of potential relationships that can emerge from our system of 
massive overlapping jurisdiction—should be of great interest to both 
federalism’s stalwarts and traditional nationalists. 
